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Introduction
It is a commonplace that the evolution of empirical disciplines is marked by periods in which scientists use inconsistent hypotheses to predict various groups of phenomena. Recent philosophy, acknowledging that the growth of knowledge is too important topic to leave entirely to historians, sociologists and psychologists, rejects in general the standard discovery - justification distinction and attempts to accommodate the variety of scientific practices, including inconsistency, within a unitary account of how science proceeds. 
Bohr’s atomic model – described by Lakatos as ‘sat like a baroque tower upon the Gothic base of classical electrodynamics’– is one of the better known examples of empirically successful, albeit inconsistent, theoretical frameworks in the history of physics. For this reason, many philosophers use Bohr’s model to illustrate their position for the occurrence and function of inconsistency in the history of science. 
I take the view that, to understand science as a way of knowing, epistemology must come to grips with the historical processes of knowledge development. Accordingly, I think that the representational and constructive practices of scientists have to be construed as part of scientific method and as such to be placed within the province of philosophical investigation. However, my work, questioning the possibility (and the utility) of confining scientific practice within the borders of a rather pre-decided epistemology, approaches history of science through a dialectical form of analysis: it draws on philosophical theories to the extent that they enlighten prominent historical cases and, at the same time, indicates the possible limitations of these theories or along what lines these theories need revision, extension or refinement. From this perspective, I proceeded to a fine-structure examination of Bohr’s research program (the starting point of which was the formulation of his atomic model) and to a critical comparison of the structure and the aims of this program with some of its contemporary philosophical readings. In this paper, I examine whether Bohr’s model is adaptable to a form of paraconsistent logic as certain philosophers claim.

Bohr’s Model: Formulation and Methodological Foundation
Bohr’s atomic model (Bohr 1913) emerged from his endeavor to restore the stability of atoms to Rutherford’s planetary model of the atom. The electrons, which, in Rutherford’s model, were assumed to circle around the positive nucleus, would, according to classical theory, quickly lose their energy by emission of radiation and would end up by being captured by the nucleus. Bohr circumvented this disaster by introducing a non-classical notion of stability embodied in his concept of ‘stationary state’: the electron is now assumed to move at a fixed distance around the nucleus without giving off energy through radiation. By definition, the ‘stationary states’ were subjected to the following assumptions:
1)	An atom can exist permanently only in discontinuous series of stationary states (the so- called ‘quantum postulate’); transitions between stationary states occur suddenly and, therefore, elude description in terms of classical mechanics and electrodynamics.
1)	The motion of the electrons in a stationary state is determined by applying classical mechanics to Rutherford’s model.
1)	The frequency of the radiation emitted/absorbed during a transmission between two stationary states is given by the difference in energy between these states divided by Planck’s constant (this is the ‘frequency rule’).
The internal inconsistency of Bohr’ model is apparent: while the second assumption permits the application of classical mechanics in the area of stationary states, the first assumption abandons the continuity imposed by classical physics to the change of state of physical systems (a continuity allowing a continuum of possible orbits) and the third assumption contradicts the demand of classical electrodynamics as regards the identity between the frequency of the motion in a source with the frequency of the radiation emitted by the source.
The assumptions (1) and (2) were insufficient to determine the energy of the stationary states. Bohr, therefore, introduced a ‘quantum rule’ in order to select stationary states from the continuous manifold of the classically possible ones. This rule represents the first and vaguest expression of what Bohr would later call ‘Correspondence Principle’ (CP).
 The CP cannot be expressed in exact quantitative laws. However, its implementation in different problems, for over a decade (1913-1925), permits us to give the following qualitative description: the CP refers to a formal analogy between classical physics and Bohr’s atomic model – and, later, the ‘old’ quantum mechanics (QM) – consisting in the fact that with each of the quantum transitions there can be associated a Fourier component of the classical motion of the electron in a concrete stationary state and that the frequencies calculated by (3), in the limit of large quantum numbers, will tend to coincide with the frequencies emitted classically by the ‘corresponding’ Fourier component.

Is Bohr’s Model Adaptable to a Form of Paraconsistent Logic?
It is well known that, in classical logic, an inconsistent set of premises yields any well-formed statement as consequence. This means that classical logic is explosive, in the sense that, according to it, a contradiction entails everything. Thus, the core thought behind paraconsistensy is to provide logics that do not permit one to infer anything from inconsistent premises. Namely, a logic is said to be paraconsistent iff its logical consequence relation, ⊨, is not explosive. Thus, if ⊨ is paraconsistent, then, even if we are in circumstances where the available information is inconsistent, the inference relation does not explode into triviality. 
It is evident that paraconsistent logic is at least expected to be capable of treating inconsistent information as informative. An important motivation for the construction of such a logic is the fact that classical logic fails in general as logic of discovery. Thus, for many philosophers, the logic of discovery is paraconsistent. On this view, a logic is said to be paraconsistent if it can be employed as the underlying logic of inconsistent but nontrivial theories (Arruda 1980). The question now is: the various systems of paraconsistent logic (overviews in Brown 2002; Priest 2002) can reliably interpret the function of inconsistency in Bohr’s atomic model? In what follows I examine three representative examples.

Bohr’s Model and Dialetheism
A ‘dialetheia’ is a statement that is both true and false. So the negation of a dialetheia is both false and true and the conjunction of a dialetheia with its negation is both true and false; in particular, it is true. Hence, if there are dialetheias, as the proponents of dialetheism claim, there are true contradictions in defiance of the Law of Non-Contradiction (a recent discussion on dialetheism in Priest et al. 2004).
Dialetheism should be clearly distinguished from trivialism: whereas the latter considers that all contradictions are true, the former claims that some (and, usually, very specific) sentences (or propositions) are dialetheias. Thus, by adopting a paraconsistent logic, a dialetheist can countenance some contradictions without being thereby committed to countenancing everything. Following this line, Graham Priest, a prominent defender of dialetheism, blocks the classical generation of all possible propositions from an inconsistent theory through the adoption of a form of paraconsistent logic in which certain contradictions are tolerated (Priest 1987). 
Important for our purposes is the fact that Priest includes among the pragmatic grounds for adopting his position Bohr’s model (ibid, p. 127). However, scientific theories to be adapted in Priest’s system must be regarded as ‘true contradictions simpliciter’, that is, contradictions that are true at the actual world. On this basis, dialetheic logics offer new accounts of how one can satisfy classically inconsistent sets of sentences, while retaining the standard account of consequence relations as founded on truth-preservation (e.g. Priest and Berto 2008). But assertions of actual truth in the case of Bohr’s model seem particularly inapt. Leaving aside the crucial historical fact of its subsequent supersession, Bohr himself, in introducing his model, explicitly declared that the foremost objective of his task was only “to afford a basis for a theory of the constitution of atoms” (Bohr 1913, pp. 162-163, my emphasis) and, in concluding his paper, did not omit to underline “the preliminary and hypothetical character of the above considerations” (ibid, p. 179, my emphasis). But over and above all, the thorough study of Bohr’s research program leaves no doubt that the thrust of his efforts was laying in eventually understanding “how can nature avoid contradictions” (in Bohr’s words, as reported by Heisenberg later, 1963). I think, therefore, that Priest chose a highly inadequate example to support his dialetheic approach to paraconsistency. 

Bohr’s Model and Preservationism
Dialetheist logicians can and do argue that they are the ones who really fix truth-preservation, since their notion of paraconsistent reasoning preserves the truth incorporated within an inconsistent set of premises. By contrast, preservationist logicians claim that there is and can be no truth to preserve in inconsistent premises. They think, however, that such a stance – a stance not allowing truth values to be assigned to inconsistent set of premises or to contradictions – does not cut us off from clear standards for reasoning, if we insist that our consequence relation guarantees that we don’t make things worse. They define, therefore, a paraconsistent consequence relation (called forcing) over some maximally consistent subset of the inconsistent set of premises. This relation is thought of as preserving the level of consistent fragments just as the classical consequence relation preserves consistency. But, in opposition to dialetheism, in this case the underlying semantics remains completely classical and no rejection of the Law of Non-Contradiction is involved. This approach was first developed by the Canadian logicians R. Jennings and P. Schotch and has come to be called preservationism (a recent discussion on preservationism in Schotch et al. 2009). 
A form of preservationist logic has been recently applied in the realm of discovery (Brown 1990; Brown and Priest 2004). Here, the inference procedure underlying some inconsistent but non-trivial theories in science and mathematics is regarded to be Chunk and Permeate. To capture, therefore, this procedure, preservationist logicians divide the context of application of an inconsistent theory into sub-contexts (this is a chunking strategy) in which the conflicting principles behind the inconsistency are isolated. In this way, the conjunctive application of contradictory claims is effectively blocked. Then, they add to the chunking a mechanism that allows a limited amount of information from one consistent subset (or ‘cell’ or ‘patch’) of the inconsistent theory to permeate into the other(s). 
Brown (1993) uses Bohr’s atomic theory to substantiate this view. But, although he is right in arguing that Bohr was careful to distinguish the contexts in which the classical and quantum conceptions were to be applied (assumptions 2 and 1-3 respectively), his approach fails to illuminate the function of inconsistency in Bohr’s model for the following reasons. 
From the viewpoint of preservationism, Brown rejects the dialetheist claim that inconsistent theories as a whole should be considered to be true in the correspondence sense. Instead, he espouses the notion of ‘literal commitment’ (Brown 1993, p. 400) which, as Schotch explicitly declared, involves belief in the truth of the separated self-consistent cells of the theory in the domain of their possible application: in preservationist logics, the ‘level preservation’ is considered as a way of fixing truth preservation at the precise place where the latter is thought of to be broken; hence, in the partitioning of inconsistent statements, the cells of this partition are regarded as true in the correspondence sense (Schotch 1993, p. 423). Thus, for Brown’s approach to be applicable to Bohr’s theory, the methodologically separated conceptions of classical and quantum physics must both be taken as true in the domains of their possible application. But this idea is in complete disagreement with Bohr’s view.
Indeed, Bohr, commenting on assumption (2) of his model, noted that “in the calculations of the dynamical equilibrium [i.e. the motion] in a stationary state … we need not distinguish between the actual motions and their mean values”. Thus, he declared, “the ordinary mechanics do not have an absolute validity, but only hold in calculations of certain mean values of the motion of electrons (1913, p. 167, my emphasis). “However”, he continued, “while there can be no question of a mechanical foundation of the calculations given in this paper, it is possible to give a very simple interpretation of the results of calculations by help of symbols taken from ordinary mechanics” (ibid, p. 175, my emphasis).
We see that Bohr, being convinced for “the inadequacy of the classical electrodynamics in describing the behavior of systems of atomic scale” (ibid, p. 162), stripped the classical concepts from any referential or representational content and handled them as mere symbols which were waiting for acquiring their literal meaning from the conceptual system of a consistently formulated and interpreted quantum theory. Their introduction in the quantum domain aimed at supplying quantum formalism with the vast store of formal relations and calculating techniques possessed by classical physics in order to make them driving force for the development of the incomplete quantum scheme; and the restriction of their use in the area of stationary states aimed at offering scientists the opportunity to explicitly question, conceptually analyze and experimentally examine the behavior of the fundamental classical laws in the quantum domain. Ultimately, Bohr, “by emphasizing the conflict between these considerations [the non-classical ones] with the coherent group of conceptions which have been rightly termed the classical theory” was hoping that, “in the course of time, it would be possible to discover coherence in the new ideas” (Bohr 1914a, p. 301, my emphasis).
It is then evident that, for Bohr, there was no question of ‘truth’ in the application of classical physics in the subatomic domain. What Bohr was explicitly accepting, through the use of the CP, was the approximate validity of the classical theories in the area of the large quantum numbers (in the macroscopic area) where classical physics have been empirically well-confirmed. I say ‘approximate’ validity, because, even in this area, Bohr was not ceasing to stress that “there is no question of a gradual approximation of the quantum theory in the limit of large quantum numbers to the classical ideas of the origin of radiation. Indeed … we assume in this limit that the various harmonic components of the radiation, which would be emitted simultaneously on the classical theory, will originate in quite different processes of transition between different pairs of stationary states” (Bohr 1922, p. 428, my emphasis). 
However, CP’ assumption for the approximate validity of classical physics in the limit of large quantum numbers was, on Bohr’s view, of great methodological importance, since it was giving “the hope of attaining a single picture which will include the interpretation of the experimental evidence regarding atomic processes as well as the interference of light waves [the macroscopic phenomena], although the mechanism underlying this picture will involve radical departure from the fundamental notions on which the foundation of classical theories hitherto have been sought” (Bohr 1921a, p. 413, my emphasis). 
We observe that Bohr was far from displaying any sort of ‘literal commitment’ to classical physics, a commitment which, on Brown’s view, involves belief to the ‘contextual truth’ of the aspects of classical theory used in Bohr’s model. As Bohr’s words clearly indicate, the ultimate purpose of his research was the explanatory unification of scientific knowledge in the following sense: the CP was intended to lead to a new theory (possibly, radically different from classical physics), which ought to offer successful predictions and a unified physical explanation of both the macroscopic and subatomic phenomena.
 

Bohr’s Research Program and the Generalized Correspondence Principle
Is it then possible that we may regard Bohr’s model as ‘partially true’, the ‘elements of truth’ being attached to the formal relations (the ‘structural elements’) of classical physics imported into it by means of the CP, as Da Costa and French (2003) seem to suggest? I say that they ‘seem’ to suggest, because, although they refer to Bohr’s research program (pp. 81-83), it is rather unclear whether they equate the CP, as handled by Bohr, with the Generalized Correspondence Principle (GCP), the heuristic function of which they want to underline. Anyway, their point of view permits us to emphasize the essential differentiation of Bohr’s CP from the GCP: whereas the latter states that any acceptable new theory T should degenerate into its predecessor T΄ under those conditions under which T΄ has been empirically well-confirmed, the former sets the demand of asymptotic agreement of the numerical results of classical physics and QM in the limit of large quantum numbers, that is, in the domain where the classical theory has been empirically well-confirmed. 
Bohr, wishing to make clear this differentiation, was not omitting to point out that “in the limiting region of large quantum numbers there is in no wise a question of a gradual diminution of the difference between the description by the quantum theory of the phenomena of radiation and the ideas of classical electrodynamics, but only of an asymptotic agreement of the statistical results” (Bohr 1923, p. 480, my emphasis). There is, therefore, an important point to note here: Bohr’s CP, in opposition to the GCP, in no way presupposes the structural compatibility of successive theories, since it permits two incompatible theoretical structures to give practically identical numerical results in the domain of their common application. 
Da Costa and French, wishing to accommodate the heuristic function of inconsistency in science, introduce a form of paraconsistent logic not at the structural level of the theory itself, as Priest and Brown do, but at the epistemic level: paraconsistent logic is a logic of ‘scientific acceptance’, a logic that permits one to go along with a theory as a premiss for all the purposes to which it is applicable. This movement permits them to blur the distinction between heuristics and justification by conceiving models and theories as incomplete structures which are placed within the regime of ‘pragmatic’ or ‘quasi’ truth. Given then the incompleteness of the theoretical structures, theory development is seen as one of defining and redefining the relationships between their appropriate substructures according to heuristic criteria, the most important of which is the GCP. The latter is taken as expressing the idea that certain substructure of the theory will be bequeathed to its successor, an idea that grounds the cumulative growth of knowledge – advocated by the ontic form of structural realism (e.g. French and Ladyman 2003, p. 45) – on the structural continuity of the successive theories. 
However, as already mentioned, it is precisely this idea embodied to the use of the GCP the one that marks its foundational divergence from Bohr’s CP. Bohr’s reaction against Debye’s opinion that “if there should be reality in this kind of considerations [those presented in Bohr’s model] there had to be a general principle which allowed one to understand the connection between the quantum theory and electrodynamics” is indicative of his state of mind: “I tried to say [Bohr wrote to his friend Oseen] that the necessity of such a principle is not evident … and that the possibility of a comprehensive picture should perhaps not be sought in the generality of points of view, but rather in the strictest possible limitation of the applicability of the points of view” (Bohr 1914b, my emphasis). Driven by this idea, Bohr never pursued the structural unification of classical and quantum mechanics in a unitary logical scheme; on the contrary, he carefully separated the fields of possible application of the classical and quantum conceptions in the quantum domain and, by means of the CP, forced the classical - quantum antithesis to come to the forefront of theoretical analysis.
Another characteristic example of Bohr’s thought is presented in his juxtaposition with Sommerfeld, the leader of the famous Munich school. Sommerfeld, being reluctant to trust the products of Bohr’s unsharply formulated CP and striving instead for logically closed theories along the lines suggested by the GCP, contradistinguished the two modes of inquiry as follows: “By a remarkably rigorous manner of deduction, reminiscent of the incontrovertible logic of numerical calculations, we have arrived from the principle of conservation of angular momentum at a principle of selection and a rule of polarization … On the other hand, Bohr has discovered in his principle of correspondence a magic wand (which he himself calls a formal principle), which allows us immediately to make use of the results of the classical wave theory in the quantum theory” (Sommerfeld 1923, pp. 265-266, 275). But, in Bohr’s opinion, a closed approach would necessarily lead to stagnation, since “it would hardly be possible to extend [its applications]” “Instead”, he remarked, “the situation may be different in the case of the correspondence viewpoint which proves to have been fruitful in ever new realms of application … This is connected with the circumstance that this viewpoint is not at all a closed formal one, but may rather be regarded as a description of certain general features of the radiation processes … [Thus], with each extension of the application of the quantum theory we better perceive the nature of the riddle” (Bohr 1921b, p. 356, my emphasis).
To better understand Bohr’s thesis, it is worth bearing in mind that his model was not intended “to propose an explanation of the spectral laws, but to indicate a way to bring the spectral laws in close connection with other properties of the elements appearing equally inexplicable” (Bohr 1913, p. 179). Οn Bohr’s view, the attainment of this aim demanded an effective interplay between theory and experiment. More specifically, scientists, “standing entirely on virgin ground, upon introducing new assumptions”, needed “take care not to get to contradiction with experiment” (Bohr 1914a, p. 292). But this was not enough, since “the question” was “not only the prediction of experimental facts but just [as] much by means of these to develop the deficient theoretical conceptions” of those days (Bohr 1921a, p. 400).  What was needed, therefore, to effectively promote “the play between the application of definitely stated theoretical conceptions [the assumptions of his model] and the developing of these conceptions through information drawn from established facts” (ibid, p. 400) was an exceptionally open and flexible methodological tool. 
Indeed, the CP was by its very nature creative rather than analytic and logical; and its function was primarily to suggest and illuminate rather than to prove. Due to its qualitative character and flexible content, it has permitted Bohr’s model and, later, the ‘old’ QM to assimilate new theoretical works (e.g. Einstein’s theory of radiation in 1916 and Ehnrefest’s adiabatic principle in 1917) and, thereby, to evolve with theoretical progress; and its adaptability to new experimental data has permitted experimental activity to function as controller and co-former of the evolving quantum scheme for over a decade. 
No one can, of course, deny that the impressive development of the quantum formalism is greatly in dept to the formal modes of scientific inquiry. But, today, we are obliged to admit that it was Bohr’s open epistemology the one that mainly favored the emergence of a theory that was proven structurally incompatible with its predecessor.

Conclusions
The present study does in no way dispute the mathematical significance of the various forms of paraconsistent logic or their significance in computer science, linguistics and philosophy of science. The question it raises is whether extending logic to cover inference and reasoning obliterates distinctions we want to have. Indeed, history of science teaches us that actual scientific inference often passes over what are widely accepted to be deductive consequences and often involves a retreat from commitments rather than their extension to a newly recognized consequence. Additionally, the study of the various systems of logic reveals that what logic is considered ‘best’ may vary depending on the different aims and constraints most central to the applications that those working on logical theory have in mind.
It is, for example, evident that the works considered in this paper encapsulate in their system of logic a substantial metaphysical/semantical theory and defend, each in its own way, the claim that science succeeds in developing an ever more perfect picture of the world, because scientific theories (and/or models) incorporate, at least, true theoretical cores which survive even in radical theory change. This is, of course, a specific meta-scientific view; and it could be hardly expectable from it to be in harmony with all the meta-theories under which the scientists themselves view their work. This is exactly what is happening in Bohr’s case. Because Bohr, being convinced from the very beginning that “in assuming Planck’s theory, we have manifestly acknowledged the inadequacy of ordinary electrodynamics and have definitely parted with the coherent group of ideas on which the latter theory is based” (Bohr 1914a, p. 292), supplied his atomic model with a methodological tool (the CP) which, instead of presupposing the cumulative growth of knowledge, was intended to reveal the possible structural, conceptual or ontological incompatibility of classical physics and QM.
For this very reason, the CP has permitted theory and observation to enter on an equal footing in the domain of scientific inquiry, it has permitted scientists to use the available formal resources as a basis for the pursuit of radically new knowledge and it has opened an era of crucial tests between new and background knowledge. In this way, it has permitted scientists to trace the roots of the classical - quantum antithesis as deeper as they could and to be involved in experimental activities and reasoning processes which have gradually led them to reach a logically consistent quantum theory. The emergence of this theory attested the structural incompatibility of classical and quantum mechanics (separability vs. non-separability of their Boolean and non-Boolean, respectively, logical structures), revealed the wide conceptual gap between the two theories (QM safely asserts that the separable physical world implied by the logical structure of classical physics is a phenomenal world, the world of human perception and everyday experience) and, from a realistic standpoint, could be taken as offering radically new knowledge for the physical world (the recognition of the essential ‘wholeness’ of subatomic processes). Furthermore, QM was proven capable of explaining the failure of classical physics in the quantum domain – by clearly indicating that the classical conception of the ‘isolated’ physical objects, and the classical concepts referring to them, are nothing more than idealizations exclusively applicable in the macroscopic domain – and of accurately determining the area of classical physics’ approximate application.
Commenting this point, it is worth remarking that Bohr’s mode of inquiry justifies the claim that a methodology which takes into account the possible fundamental incompatibility of successive theories does in no way diminish the possibility of assessing the progress of scientific knowledge. Indeed, the explanatory unification of scientific knowledge – the one that CP was steadily promoting and the new theory was expected to offer – was positing a concrete criterion of progress for the evaluation of the theoretical developments of that time.
Finally, it is worth noting that the thorough study of Bohr’s research program permits us to understand how it is that scientists build on existing structures while creating genuine novelty i.e. how new and sometimes radically different conceptual structures grow out from the old. Accordingly, it permits us to also understand the rationality of scientific concept formation in cases of large-scale conceptual change – a rationality that generally transcends the constrained inferences of strict logic – and of establishing the continuous and non-cumulative growth of knowledge taking place in such cases.
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